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ABSTRACT
This research aimed to investigate the influence earnings management to the compensa-
tion of the Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP). Taking agency theory to explain the
conflict between managers and shareholders. It was expected that ESOP would increase
the managerial responsibility to companies, but the managers have abused it to gain
more benefits for themselves. This research used simple linear regression and multiple
linear regression analysis with a sample of 120 publicly traded companies listed on the
Stock Exchange during 2011-2014. This study had one independent variable (ESOP) and
controls four variables (managerial ownership, institutional ownership, board of direc-
tors and audit committees). The result of this study was that earnings management had a
positive impact in improving employee compensation due to ESOP program. The exist-
ence of managerial ownership and commissioners could reduce earnings management
actions in the implementation of the ESOP.
ABSTRAK
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui pengaruh manajemen laba terhadap kompensasi melalui
Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP). Pemilihan Agency theory untuk menjelaskan konflik
kepentingan antara pihak manajer dan pemegang saham. Keberadaan ESOP dapat meningkatkan
tanggung jawab pihak manajerial, namun pihak manajerial menyalahgunakan program ESOP
untuk meningkatkan keuntungan mereka sendiri. Penelitan ini menggunakan analisis regresi
linier sederhana dan regresi linier berganda dengan 120 sampel perusahaan go public yang
tercatat di BEI selama 2011-2014. Penelitian ini memiliki satu variabel independen (ESOP) dan
empat variabel kontrol (kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional, dewan komisaris dan
komite audit). Hasil penelitian ini menemukan bahwa manajemen laba memiliki dampak positif
dalam meningkatkan kompensasi yang didapatkan karyawan dengan adanya program ESOP.
Keberadaan kepemilikan manajerial dan dewan komisaris dapat mengurangi tindakan manajemen
laba dalam pelaksanaan program ESOP.
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Earnings management can be a dangerous disease
within the company. Earnings management always
involves two parties, namely the management
(agent) who have a responsibility to the stockhold-
ers (principal). The conflict between the two par-
ties led to the theory of agency (agency theory).
Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued that the agency
theory describes the agent is a party contracted
by the shareholders who are given the power to
make a decision on behalf of shareholders. Raised
the question of the agency (agency problem) be-
cause one party is more concerned with personal
interests despite harm others (Sulistyanto, 2008).
Shareholders who are not directly involved
in the company hand over the trust to the man-
agement to increase corporate profits. The com-
pany benefits as a benchmark for the sharehold-
ers in assessing the performance of employees. One
of the actions of shareholders in appreciating the
performance of their employees by giving bonus
in the form of salary or incentive of equity.
Incentives equity by the company in the form
of Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) or compen-
sation to the management and employees are ex-
pected to align the interests of management and
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). ESOP has
been set in SFAS No. 53 (revised 2010) concerning
payment of shares. Rewarding to management is
expected to give incentive to management to im-
prove its performance and foster a sense of respon-
sibility towards the company. It can be recognized
that more regulation new already available com-
pared to SFAS No. 53 (revised 2010), will but the
company being taken on period observation re-
search from 2011-2014 will more corresponding with
the old regulation because they guided him.
In Indonesia, equity incentive is better
known as the ESOP or Employee Stock Option
Program (POSK). The stock option program pro-
vides the opportunity for executive employees to
own shares of the entity through giving (grants)
stock options for his services. Ownership of the
shares granted by the company to be an alternative
to promote accountability responsible management
and employees, so it will careful in making deci-
sions (Herdinata, 2012). But the existence of the
options considered misused by management to
obtain higher compensation for their own benefit.
Asyik (2006) found that the executive em-
ployees of companies have implemented equity
incentive can perform earnings management by
adjusting earnings with lower earnings (income
decreasing) and raise the profit (income increas-
ing) reported after the date of grant of stock op-
tions do. Cheng & Warfield (2005) and
Bergstresser & Philippon (2006) found that man-
agers with high equity incentives to sell shares
higher after the earnings announcement.
Earnings management actions in the imple-
mentation of the ESOP may harm companies and
investors. Herdinata (2012) suggests the program
ESOP could harm investors by playing a game earn-
ings by reducing profit for each share. For ensure
the implementation of the ESOP program properly,
the necessary implementation mechanisms Corpo-
rate Governance (CG) is good. Cadbury (1992) also
explained that corporate governance be a system
to protect the company continues to run well. Cor-
porate governance is becoming a major party as
mediator between the board of directors, share-
holders and auditors, as well as third-party sync
relationship (Chen et al., 2010). Corporate gover-
nance be a good supervision to keep the implemen-
tation of the ESOP program would not be detri-
mental to shareholders. Kim & Graskamp (2006)
states that the ESOP will go well with the imple-
mentation of corporate governance mechanisms.
This study has some differences with previ-
ous research namely, ownership structure that
consists of managerial ownership and institutional
ownership, as well as the board of directors and
the audit committee of control variables is not a
major focus of research. Their managerial owner-
ship and institutional ownership, as well as the
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board of directors and audit committee as control
variables is expected to reduce the happening of
earnings management. Based on the background
formulated in this study that is whether equity
incentive or ESOP effects on earnings management
in companies go public Indonesia Stock Exchange
(BEI) in the period 2011-2014.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Scott (2012) defines earnings management as
following earnings management is the choice by a
manager of accounting policies, or action affecting
earnings, so as to active some specific report earn-
ings objectives. Earnings management will make
profit no corresponding with reality existing
economy. The profits would be displayed follow
desire management for shows good performance
(Richardson, 1998). Rahayu & Cahyati (2015) sug-
gests earnings management be form intervention
party management, with improve or lowered profit
with make use of weaknesses of the accounting sys-
tem allowed in standard accounting. Measurement
of earnings management through discretionary ac-
cruals with how to reduce total accruals (TAC) and
Non-Discretionary Accruals (NDA). An estimator
can be seen in Table 1.
The Effect of Employee Stock Option Plan on
Earnings Management
Equity incentives or ESOPs are one way to
improve employee performance and oversight of
the company. In accordance with the rules of
BAPEPAM in 2002 on ESOP, companies implement-
ing ESOP program is expected to be a separate
motivation for those who get bonus in the form of
shares to be more responsible to the company.
Schabus (2012) who finds that earnings manage-
ment real is something It is common do in period
post -SOX (Sarbanes Oxley), thus showing a nega-
tive relationship between earnings management
and incentive equity because no all manager will
do for the sake of price manipulation stock more
is higher due to their ESOP follow.
ESOP is expected to be one of the employee
motivation to improve its performance, more
abused by manipulating financial statements in
order to obtain a big bonus at the end of the year
during the period of ESOP implementation. Re-
search by Cheng & Warfield (2005), which
strengthened with research Bergstresser &
Philippon (2006) and Kusuma (2014), found incen-
tive equity have influence significant to its hap-
pening earnings management, because found that
the relationship between the CFO and CEO in the
emergence an earnings management. Yermack
(1997) also found that the weakness of the system
in the company can make the management can play
around the stock price. Shares owned by employ-
ees can present shareholding by way of the num-
ber of shares owned by employees against the
number of shares issued in the previous year
(Trebucq, 2004). ESOP measurement in accordance
with measurement Asyik (2006) and Astika (2008)
can be seen in Table 1
Based on explanation in above, earnings
management can arise with the ESOP program.
Such management and employee actions result in
earnings management occurring due to a conflict
of interest between management and owners
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the basis of these
researchers make ESOP as a major factor in re-
search, so the hypotheses proposed is:
Ha: equity incentive effect on earnings manage-
ment
Reducing the occurrence of earnings man-
agement, implementation corporate governance
mechanisms in the implementation of the ESOP
may be a way to safeguard the interests differ-
ently by each party that are directly related to the
company. Forms of corporate governance that is
used in this research that institutional ownership,
managerial ownership, audit committee and board
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of commissioners. The existence of corporate gov-
ernance is expected to help control and suppress
the occurrence of earnings management in the
implementation of the ESOP program. The exist-
ence of control variables can describe and explain
the relationship of a variable with more complete
and good information (Hartono, 2010). Control
variables are not a top priority in research to be
tested and researched, but is Other variables that
have effect in this study. Measurements of corpo-
rate governance into the control variable can be
seen on Table 1.
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on
Earnings Management
The ownership structure is not just one way
to reduce the principal and agent conflict within
the company, but it plays an important role as a
third party to mediate the interests of the com-
pany that will not hurt one of them. There are sev-
eral types of ownership structures by Jensen &
Meckling (1976), but researchers only focused into
two forms of ownership structure consisting of
institutional ownership and managerial ownership.
Balsam et al. (2002), Midiastuty & Machfoedz
(2003), and Cornet et al. (2006), found that a large
institutional ownership can reduce earnings man-
agement action, because of the greater supervi-
sion which will be done by the investor. Research-
ers use institutional ownership as a supporting
variable to prevent earnings management as the
findings of Hermeindito (2004). Hermeindito found
that institutional ownership can control the actions
of earnings management and improve the quality
of financial reporting.
The Effect of Managerial Ownership on
Earnings Management
Boediono (2005) and Iqbal & Fachriyah
(2005) found that managerial ownership can mini-
mize the occurrence of opportunistic behavior of
managers that have an impact on the reduction of
earnings management. This may reflect that own-
ership by management can affect earnings man-
agement action. Managerial ownership is one of
the supporting factors in decreasing earnings man-
agement. Research Partners (2002) proved that the
large managerial stock ownership, the more con-
sistent desire shareholders and investors so that
managerial ownership does not affect the occur-
rence of earnings management (Mitra, 2002).
The Effect of  Audit Committee on Earnings
Management
Krishnan (2003) conducted a study on the
occurrence earnings management in the year 1996
to 2000 in United States and discover the poten-
tial of earning management will be smaller with
the existence of an audit committee. The large
number of audit committees will increase super-
vision in financial reporting by management
(Abbott et al., 2004). The study was supported by
research Kumaat (2013) and Krishnan (2003) that
the audit committee has no effect on earnings
management.
The Effect of Board of Commissioners on
Earnings Management
In accordance with the rules of the Jakarta
Stock Exchange (2000) described that the propor-
tion of the board of commissioners is at least 30
percent of all members of the board of commis-
sioners. Commissioners should have a comparable
amount to have is not the controlling shareholder
(Wedari, 2004). Chen and Steiner (2000) found the
characteristics of the commissioners be seen from
the number of attendance, independence and ten-
ure of the council relating to the level of fraud in a
company. Wedari (2004) found the negative rela-
tionship and significant from board of commission-
ers and audit committees as a supporting factor
that can reduce the action of earnings management.
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METHODS
Taking sample by using secondary data from
the annual report publicly traded company listed
on the Stock Exchange during 2011-2014. This
study uses 30 companies that implement ESOP
policy on period time the multiplied by 4 years’
time observation produces 120 samples that can
tested. Because company still guided PSAK No.53
(revised 2010) for period data retrieval, then new
regulations no a standard in research this. This
study uses the classical assumption test consisting
of normality test, autocorrelation, heteroscedasti-
city test, and multicollinearity test.
The model used in this study did 2 analyses
as follows. The model analysis in this study can
be derived as follows:
ML = ?0 + ?1 PESOP + ?2KeM + ?3KeI+ ?4 DeKom +
?5KA + e
Information:
ML : earnings management
?O : constant
?1..5 : regression coefficient
PESOP : percentage of total shares options in
the form of outstanding ESOPs against
shares outstanding in the previous
year.
KeM : percentage of ownership of manage-
ment shares to total company’s shares
in year t
KeI : the percentage of institutional share
ownership of total company’s shares
in year t
KAit : the number of audit committee mem-
bers in year t
DeKom : percentage of independent commis-
sioners to total commissioners in year
t
e : error
This study uses 1 dependent variable, 1 in-
dependent variable, and 3 control variables. The
operational explanation of variables in this study,
dependent variable is earnings management, us-
ing the Modified Jones Model to compute:
Total accrual:
TACC = NIit – CFOit
Nondiscretionary accrual (NDA) = TACCt/TAt-1=
?1(1 / TAt-1) +?2(?REV it/TAt-1) + ?3(PPEit /TA-t) + ?t
NDAt= ?1(1/TAt-1)+?2 ((?REVt - ?RECt)/TAt-1) + ?3
(PPEt/TAt-1) + ?t
Earnings Management (EM):
EM = (TACCt/TAt-1) – NDAt
EM : discretionary accruals for firm i in pe-
riod t
NDAt : non-discretionary accruals for firm i
in period t
NIit : net income of the company i in period
t
TACCit : total accrual for firm i in period t
CFOit : flow Operating cash flow for firm i in
period t
TAi-t : total assets of the company i in the pre-
vious period
?REVit : change sales company i in period t.
?RECt : change of accounts receivable of com-
pany in period t.
PPEit : asset remain firm i in period t
?it : error
Independent variable is Employee Stock
Option Plan (ESOP) to compute:
PESOP = JSK
JSB
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PESOP : percentage Employee Stock Option
Plan (ESOP),
JSK : number of shares owned by employ-
ees, and
JSB : number of shares outstanding at the
beginning or end of the previous year
(t-1).
Control variables is corporate governance
comprising:
Managerial ownership (KeM):
Institutional ownership (KeI):
Board of Commissioners = the proportion
of the board of commissioners (DeKom), which is
the number of the board of commissioners of the
company divided by the board of commissioners
from internal parties to the company.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The results of descriptive statistics show the
data for ESOP minimum is 0.00. This means own-
ership of shares granted to employees is still not
widely issued to the ESOP, although limits only
10 percent of the issued shares (Bapepam, 2006).
Managerial ownership variables are known by
dividing the number of manager shares with total
outstanding shares. Based on the descriptive sta-
tistics obtained, the average value of managerial
ownership is 0.13. The minimum managerial own-
ership value is -2.00 and maximum of 1.64, with a
standard deviation of 0.86. This descriptive sta-
tistic of managerial ownership proves that the low
level of share ownership is given to the company.
Institutional ownership variables can be deter-
mined by dividing the number of institutional
shares with total outstanding shares. The average
value of institutional ownership at 52.31, the mini-
mum value in below 0, 00, and a maximum of 99,
00, with a standard deviation of 26.32. The result
of the description of institutional ownership proves
that the number of shares owned by the stock is
owned solely by an individual (WSKT). Descrip-
tive statistics of variables commissioners found a
mean value of 32.36 and has been qualified, pub-
lished by BAPEPAM and BEI. As well as for audit
committee variables measured by the number of
members of the audit committee. The average
value of the audit committee of 0.85, the minimum
value of 0.00, and a maximum of 1.00, with a stan-
dard deviation of 0, 36. In the audit committee,
the researchers used a variable dummy, thus ob-
tained the result that be how companies surveyed
have an audit committee.
KeM =   Number  of  Shares  of  Management  Party
Total  Shares  Outstanding
 x 100% 
KeI = 
Number  of  Institutional  Share  Shares
Shares  Outstanding
 x 100% 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Earnings Management 120 .00 1.20 .5243 .27083 
ESOP 120 -2.30 .01 -1.4948 .60716 
Managerial Ownership 120 -2.00 1.64 .1283 .85946 
Institutional Ownership 120 .00 99.00 52.3096 26.32081 
Board of Commissioner 120 .00 50.00 32.3625 12.05939 
Audit Committee 120 .00 1.00 .8500 .35857 
Valid N (listwise) 120     
Table 1. Data Descriptive Statistics
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Normality Test Results
This research is also use study normality data
analysis through assumption classic as test
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, autocorrelation, hetero-
scedasticity test, and multicollinearity test. Results
test show all the data of otherwise normal and
feasible for processed on stages inferential statis-
tical tests.
Table 2. Testing Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tic test on Table 3 obtained Durbin-Watson value
amounted to 1,955 and the Durbin Watson table
for ?= 5 percent, was found dU= 1.7896 and 4-dU=
2.211, in order to obtain 1,790 <1,955 <2,211. Re-
gression model will be better if there is no corre-
lation between independent variables and control
variables. Therefore, it can be concluded that there
is no inter-residual autocorrelation.
Heteroscedasticity Test Results
This study tested using Glejser tester. Results
of testing with Glejser tester as shown in Table 4 is
known that the significance of all the independent
variables is greater than 0.05. These results can be
concluded that the regression model is free from
problems heteroscedasticity problems in ESOP vari-
able, managerial ownership, institutional owner-
ship, board of directors and audit committee.
Multicollinearity Test Results
Detect the occurrence of multicollinearity on
research, visits of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF).
VIF> 10 illustrates that this research model hap-
pens multicollinearity and VIF <10, then the re-
search is free from multicollinearity. Based on cal-
culations in Table 6 can be seen that the results of
the calculation results cannot be found VIF inde-
pendent variables that have a VIF value of less
 Unstandardized Residual 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.566 
Asymp. Sig. (2-Tailed) 0.906 
In simple linear regression analysis, the data
used must meet the assumption of normality, that
is the data used normal distribution. Based on the
test Kolmogorov-Smirnov in Table 2, gained sig-
nificance worth 0.906, where the value is greater
than ?= 0.05. Values greater significance than ?=
0.05, it was decided to accept H0 and it is con-
cluded that the data is normally distributed, i.e.
the assumption of normality is meet.
Autocorrelation Test
Autocorrelation testing is done to determine
whether there is autocorrelation in the model. The
test is performed with the Durbin-Watson statis-
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .426a .182 .146 .25033 1.955 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .092 .067  1.368 .174 
ESOP .005 .022 .022 .234 .815 
Managerial Ownership .018 .016 .112 1.189 .237 
Institutional Ownership .001 .001 .145 1.493 .138 
Board of Commissioner .000 .001 .031 .304 .762 
Audit Committee .070 .039 .176 1.781 .078 
Table 3. Test Autocorrelation
Table 5. Heteroscedasticity Test
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than 10 as well as the tolerance value is greater
than 0.10. S then it can be proven that this data is
not contained between ESOP multicollinearity,
managerial ownership, institutional ownership,
board of directors, and audit committees in this
study regression model.
Hypothesis Testing Results
This study obtained the results that can be
summarized as follows:
The test hypothesis results, can be derived
regression equation as follows:
Y= ? + ? 1ESOP + ? 2KeM+ ? 3KeI + ?4DeKom + ?
5KA+ e
Y= 0.891 + 0.084X – 0.059K1 + 0.000K2 – 0.007K3 –
0.049K4
Based on Table 2, it is known that the ESOP
have a significant effect in increasing earnings
management. ESOP significance value of 0.031 and
t statistics of 2.187. These results illustrate that the
existence of an ESOP program can increase the
occurrence of earnings management. This happens
because of the management’s deviant behavior in
following the ESOP program.
In addition to the ESOP, there are four con-
trol variables in this research that managerial own-
ership, institutional ownership, board of directors
and audit committee. Results of the roller 4 vari-
ables control found only two variables that mana-
gerial ownership and control of the board of com-
missioners that can reduce the occurrence of earn-
ings management.
The value of the coefficient of determina-
tion R2 (R-square of 18.2%) show diversity in the
variation of earnings management variables. The
remaining portion of 82.8% is explained by other
factors not discussed in this study. These results
explain that the existence of control variables still
have an impact in the management affect earnings,
although influence pertained small. Managerial
ownership, institutional ownership, commission-
ers, and committee audit can improve the diver-
sity of the variation in earnings management.
Model ESOP Managerial 
Ownership 
Institutional 
Ownership 
Board of 
Commissioner 
Audit  
Committee 
Tolerance .978 .944 .880 .803 .850 
VIF 1.022 1.060 1.136 1.246 1.176 
Variables ? T count Sig Information 
Constant 0.891    
ESOP 0.084 2.187 0.031 Significant 
Managerial Ownership -0.059 -2.147 0.034 Significant 
Institutional Ownership 0.000 0.529 0.598 Not Significant 
Board of Commissioner -0.007 -3.175 0.002 Significant 
Audit Committee -0.049 -0.705 0.482 Not Significant 
? 0.050 
R 0.426 
R Square  0.182 
F-Count  5.059 
F-Table (0,05;5;114)  2.295 
Sig. F  0.000 
t-table (0,025;114)  1.981 
Table 6. Test Multicollinearity
Table 7. The results of hypothesis testing (with Control Variable)
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DISCUSSION
Based on these results it can be stated the
alternative hypothesis is accepted that the ESOP
effect on earnings management. Researchers found
that the occurrence of increased earnings manage-
ment in the presence of ESOP due to the increas-
ing number of fraud committed by the manage-
ment to obtain a big bonus from the company.
Management will take advantage of existing op-
portunities by playing stock prices during the
implementation of the ESOP program. The more
the number of stock options held by employees,
the greater the potential acts of cheating to be done.
The high level of abuse in this ESOP pro-
gram is due dissatisfaction with the management
side compensation obtained from company and
bonus can be gotten. This push practice manipula-
tion of financial statements in order to obtain
greater bonuses. Manipulation of financial state-
ments to earn a big bonus with the ESOP program
is to play the stock price of the company. One
modus operandi is the management will strive to
reduce the share price, so that management wants
to follow mem ESOP can buy cheaply. On the other
hand, management will be increasing annual price
of its shares to attract investors to shares in the
company and increase the compensation earned
during the ESOP program running.
The results of this study are supported by
Cheng & Warfield (2005), Bergstresser & Philippon
(2006), and Cheng et al. (2009) found that the pres-
ence of the equity incentive in the form of ESOP
can increase the occurrence of manipulation of fi-
nancial statements to keep the stock price remains
and add the value of stocks which will be sold the
future. Results the contradict with studies Schabus
(2012) who finds role ESOP positive.
Based on the research that has researchers
did, it was found that the board of directors and
managerial ownership can reduce the occurrence
of earnings management in the implementation of
the ESOP. The existence of the commissioners can
maximize oversight of the management in running
the ESOP program in order to avoid practices that
could harm the company. Moreover, the existence
of managerial ownership is also can reduce earn-
ings management. This happens because manager
has had a larger share than that offered by the
company with the implementation of the ESOP
program, so that managers focus more responsible
with the development of the company and not too
take the initiative in following the ESOP program.
Based on the results of this study can be
stated that the existence of ESOP program can in-
crease the occurrence of earnings management. The
management will try to increase the stock price at
the end of the year to get a big profit without pay-
ing attention to the shareholders. However, with
good oversight of the board of commissioners and
the existence of management ownership may re-
duce the occurrence of earnings management.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusions
Researchers found that earnings manage-
ment had a positive effect on increasing compen-
sation earned through the ESOP program. In-
creased earnings management as management
seeks to raised profits at the end of the year so
that it can gain huge profits by increasing the share
price at the end of the year so as to obtain huge
profits by following the ESOP program. Increased
earnings management due to the ESOP program
can be reduced by the control of the board of com-
missioners and managerial ownership. The audit
committee and institutional ownership has no in-
fluence over earnings management.
Suggestions
The researcher suggested that the compa-
nies implementing the ESOP program need to in-
crease the tight supervision in the presence of
board of commissioners, as well as their manage-
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rial ownership so that future actions can be re-
duced earnings management during the implemen-
tation of the ESOP program.
Subsequent research can use institutional
ownership as a control variable, given that mana-
gerial ownership of firms in Indonesia is relatively
small.
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